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Goodman, D., & Liebermann, D. G. (1992). Time-to-contact as a determiner of action: vision and motor control. In D. Elliott, & J. Proteau (Eds.), Vision and Motor Control (pp. 335–349). Amsterdam, Holland: Elsevier Pub. Co.
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Nahab, F., Kundu, P., Gallea, C., Kakareka, J., Pursley, R., Pohida, T., et al. (2011). The neural processes underlying self-agency. Cerebral Cortex, 21(1), 48–55.
Abstract: Self-agency (SA) is the individual’s perception that an action is the consequence of his/her own intention. The neural networks underlying SA are not well understood. We carried out a novel, ecologically valid, virtual-reality experiment using BOLD-fMRI where SA could be modulated in real-time while subjects performed voluntary finger movements. Behavioral testing was also performed to assess the explicit judgment of SA. Twenty healthy volunteers completed the experiment. Results of the behavioral testing demonstrated paradigm validity along with the identification of a bias that led subjects to over- or underestimate the amount of control they had. The fMRI experiment identified two discrete networks. These leading and lagging networks likely represent a spatial and temporal flow of information, with the leading network serving the role of mismatch detection and the lagging network receiving this information and
mediating its elevation to conscious awareness, giving rise to SA.
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Finkbeiner, M., & Friedman, J. (2011). The flexibility of nonconsciously deployed cognitive processes: Evidence from masked congruence priming. PLoS ONE, 6(2), e17095.
Abstract: Background
It is well accepted in the subliminal priming literature that task-level properties modulate nonconscious processes. For example, in tasks with a limited number of targets, subliminal priming effects are limited to primes that are physically similar to the targets. In contrast, when a large number of targets are used, subliminal priming effects are observed for primes that share a semantic (but not necessarily physical) relationship with the target. Findings such as these have led researchers to conclude that task-level properties can direct nonconscious processes to be deployed exclusively over central (semantic) or peripheral (physically specified) representations.
Principal Findings
We find distinct patterns of masked priming for “novel” and “repeated” primes within a single task context. Novel primes never appear as targets and thus are not seen consciously in the experiment. Repeated primes do appear as targets, thereby lending themselves to the establishment of peripheral stimulus-response mappings. If the source of the masked priming effect were exclusively central or
peripheral, then both novel and repeated primes should yield similar patterns of priming. In contrast, we find that both novel and repeated primes produce robust, yet distinct, patterns of priming.
Conclusions
Our findings indicate that nonconsciously elicited cognitive processes can be flexibly deployed over both central and peripheral representations within a single task context. While we agree that task level properties can influence nonconscious processes, our findings sharply constrain the extent of this influence. Specifically, our findings are inconsistent with extant accounts which hold that the influence of task-level properties is strong enough to restrict the deployment of nonconsciously elicited cognitive processes to a single type of representation (i.e. central or peripheral).
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